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１．Introduction
We build option model for pricing individual defined contribution pension and examined whether indi-
vidual defined contribution pensions can reduce inefficiency in defined benefit pensions in this paper.
The nature of the pension contract depends on whether the plan is a defined benefit（DB）or defined
contribution（DC）pension. In the case of DC pension, contributions are invested, often at the participant’s
direction, in stocks, bonds, or other financial instruments. In the United States, the fastest−growing DC
plan is the ４０１（k）. The ４０１（k）participants must have a choice of at least three funds to choose from a
stock index fund, a bond fund, and usually a money market. In the case of a funded DB plan, the plan
sponsor is expected to contribute to the plan in an olderly fashion according to actuarial standards, so the
needed funds are available when the worker retires.
As the period of annuity is long, the value of DB pension fluctuates. The DC pension sustains the
value by giving consumers part of the investment income.
In the case of DC pension, the insured is given a part of investment income to sustain the value of
annuity. If the investment income is higher than minimum guaranteed insurance, an excess is added to in-
surance. By contrast, if it is lower than minimum insurance, minimum insurance is paid. The DC pension,
therefore, is thought of as derivative financial assets with payments that depend upon changes in the in-
vestment income. Then the insurers give put option and receive option premium in return.
When we approximate the price of annuity to a Brownian motion process, the Black−Scholes approach
leads to the price of annuity, which is the sum of the future price of annuity and option premium. But
we can not know the exact future price. Hence, the premium is high in expecting that the future price
rises, and it is low in expecting that the future price falls.
We use the option pricing model for examining the relation between DC pension and the price fluc-
tuation. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section ２, we explain defined benefit
（DB）pension and defined contribution（DC）pension. In Section３, we prove the inefficiency of the defined
benefit pension. Section ４ provides the optimal demand for the defined benefit pension and the effect of
price fluctuation. Section ５ provides option model for pricing individual defined contribution（DC）pension
and the effect of price fluctuation. The last section provides a summary and conclusions.
２．Defined benefit and defined contribution
Workers forecast the future and save enough to smooth consumption over time. But the lifetime
budget constraint includes many uncertain components − real earnings, public and private pension benefits,
investment returns, healthcare needs, and job loss or disability. Pensions play a key role in protecting
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against these risks.
Pensions offer a mechanism for people to share longevity risk with a group of fellow−employees, but
the insurance market for individual annuities is skewed by adverse selection because people who buy indi-
vidual annuities are likely to live much longer than the population average. For this reason, a firm−based
or occupational pension plan can afford workers a valuable precommitment device.
While pensions can help mitigate these potent individual risks, they in turn expose employees covered
by a firm−based pension to risk associated with the plan sponsor − misdirection of investments or spend-
ing on too much administrative costs. Protection against such behavior often motivates government regula-
tions.
The plan sponsor risk, which arises only in DB pension, is a risk associated with under−funded plan
terminations. Protection against the risk of plan sponsor bankruptcy is to have a pension solvency guaran-
tee system. In Germany, DB pension insurance takes the form of a pay−as−you−go solvency fund.
Also county−specific risks occurs in saving via pensions. These include macroeconomic risks associated
with inflation and recession, and also country−specific fluctuations in capital markets.
People must seek international portfolio diversification to protect against these risks, since a country’s
economic and political environment fluctuates in the long run. What is worse, little can be done privately
to protect against the negative financial consequences of the potentially catastrophic crises − depression,
war. For this reason, the huge unfounded government sponsored social security system started. A govern-
ment−sponsored defined benefit system transfers income from workers to the retired generation and redis-
tributed these risks from the then old to future taxpayers.
In developing countries, DC pension has grown over the past several decades. In the United States,
the fastest−growing plan type is the popular４０１（k）.
３．Inefficiency in DB pension
At first, we explain the inefficiency of DB pension. The market economy is composed of individuals
and firms. The model proposed here is comprised of three periods. The difference of between the first and
the second period of life is only the difference of the probability of individuals’ death. An individual is
born at the beginning of the first period. The probability that he dies at the end of the first period is 
and the probability that he dies at the end of the second period is .
Individuals work only in the first period of life, earn a wage of  and do not leave their property.
Individuals live for one or two or three periods. They consume part of their first−period income and, save
the rest or purchase annuities to finance their retirement consumption. Let  denote consumption in period
. If they live for three periods, they derive utility . If they live for two periods, they derive
utility . If they live for only one period, they derive utility . Then individuals’ expected
utility  are described as follows.

Using the rate of time preference, we can reformalize as follows











 
The parameter  is the rate of time preference and the function is the utility function of con-
sumption ; is nonnegative and a concave increasing function of the consumption.
Suppose that individuals purchase annuities to maximize utility and they pay fair premium that equals
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the expected value of annuities.







where is the premium of annuities,  is the annuity in period and is the rate of riskless interest.
When individuals can purchase such an annuity and have no incentive to leave their property, they
don’t save. Because annuities, which hold , have higher profitability than saving. If they save to fi-
nance their retirement consumption, saving they need is as follows.






 

Then the budget constraint in the first, second, and third period are as follows respectively.
 
 
 	
We can derive the lifetime budget constraint from 	.






 

Consider a representative individual. His maximization problem is
max 	

subject to 




.
The first−order conditions for maximum are

 






 






. 
where  is a Lagrange multiplier. We can derive the following from .








We can derive the following results from .
If , then .
If 	, then 		.
Proposition１
When the rate of time preference is higher（lower）than the interest rate, optimal consumption increases
（decreases）with age. In the case of the DB pension, annuity in the second period equals annuity in the
third period. Therefore the DB pension is inefficient.
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４．Demand for DB pension annuity and interest rate
How does a rise of price have an effect on demand for DB pension annuity and inefficiency of DB
pension? In Section ４−１, we derive the optimal demand for DB pension when individuals save part of in-
come to make up for the shortage of DB pension. In Section ４−２, comparative statics are used to prove
how the fluctuation in the interest rate has effect on the demand for DB pension.
４−１ Basic Model
In the case of DB pension, annuity in the second period equals annuity in the third period. Therefore
if we denote fixed annuity as , then  and is rewritten as follows.






 
Since consumption changes with age, the DB pension annuity is not enough for individuals to consume
efficiently. Then individuals save part of income to make up for the shortage. Introducing saving, the
budget constraints in each period are rewritten as follows.
 
 
 
where  saving in the first period
 saving in the second period
Individuals choose consumptions in each period, saving and annuity to maximize their expected utility
under budget constraints . When we solve for , we derive the following equation.




When we assume are all nonnegative, individuals’ Lagrange function is as
follows.
	
		
 
where are the Lagrange multipliers on budget constraints and is a Lagrange multiplier on
when  is defined as follows.




are Lagrange multipliers on nonnegative constrains. Then the first−order conditions are
as follows.
	

		 

	





		 
	





		 	
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

 


 


 


 


 


 


 	


 

			 
			 
 
		from 


 from 
From 	,





  
Since 
, 
 are probability, 
	 	 . Therefore holds for any  when 

.
That is, 	 	 hold at once when 

.
４−２ Comparative Statics
As shown in the previous section, when the probability of death and demand for annuity are positive,
both savings in the first period and the second period are not positive. Then we analyze the following
two cases :（１）,（２）.
（１）	

As shown in the previous section, when the rate of time preference is higher than the interest rate,
optimal consumption decreases with age. In this case, individuals can consume enough within DB pension
annuity, so that saving in the second period is zero.
At the beginning of the first period, individuals choose consumption, saving and annuity to maximize
expected lifetime utility under budget constraints . Since by as-
sumption, the budget constraints in the second and third period is rewritten as follows.
  
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 
From and ,
 
From , the lifetime budget constraint is as follows.






 
Also, if is assumed to be nonnegative, then the Lagrange function is as follows.
	





 




 	
where 
are the Lagrange multipliers.
Now examine how does the increase of the real interest rate have effects on the demand for annuity.
From the Lagrange function 	,








 	

where









.
The Hessian matrix of the second derivatives is proved to be negative, where
	



	


	






	.
As we define  as follows, is the discounted rate of consumption in the third period.




 
From ,
	
	 
Proposition２
The rise of the interest rate increases the consumption in the second period but decreases the con-
sumption in the third period. Individuals increase saving in the first period to make up for an excess of
consumption over DB pension annuity. However profitability of saving is lower than annuity. Therefore
when the rise of the interest rate increases saving in the first period, the inefficiency of DB pension annu-
ity increases.
（２）
When the rate of time preference is smaller than the interest rate, the consumption in the second pe-
riod is smaller than the consumption in the third period and saving in the second period is positive. Since
by assumption, the budget constraints in the second and third period are as follows.
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 
 
From and ,
 
From , we can derive the following lifetime budget constraint.




where



Also,  is assumed to be nonnegative. At the beginning of the first period, individuals
choose consumption, saving and annuity to maximize their lifetime utility  under budget
constraints . Then the Lagrange function is as follows.
	


 




where 
are the Lagrange multipliers.
Now we examine how the rise of price has effects on the demand for annuity. From the Lagrange
function , we can derive the following result.





 	
From 


	




	













Proposition３
When the rate of time preference is smaller than the interest rate, the rise of interest rate decreases
consumption in the first period but increases the demand for DB pension annuity. In this case, the rise of
interest rate decreases inefficiency of annuity. However, the optimal consumption increases with age when
the rate of time preference is smaller than the interest rate. Note that inefficiency of DB pension annuity
never vanishes.
５．DC Pension Annuity
In the previous section, we prove that the rise of interest rate increases inefficiency of DB pension
annuity when the rate of time preference is larger than the interest rate. The reason is that the rise of in-
terest rate decreases the real value of DB pension annuity. In this section, we examine DC pension annu-
ity. In Section５−１, the price of DC pension annuity is derived. In Section５−２, we examine how inflation
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has effects on DC pension annuity.
５−１ Price of DC Pension Annuity
DC pension annuities, whose part of premium are invested on special account, change with investment
income. If investment income is negative, the minimum coverage is paid. On the contrary, if investment
income is positive, it is added to the minimum coverage.
Let the minimum coverage of DC pension annuity denote  dollars and the investment assets, which
is investment income added to minimum coverage, denote  dollars in the period . If  is smaller
than , insurers have to pay  dollars. On the contrary, if , then  is paid. Then a claim cost
in the period  is . In this case,  is called a（Euro-
pean）put option spread, and the minimum coverage  is called an exercise price.
Now, we assume the evolution of DC pension annuity  can be approximated by a Brownian motion
process. Then we can formally write the dynamics of this annuity’s value in stochastic differential equation
form as

where is the instantaneous expected rate of growth on this DC pension annuity ;  is the instantaneous
variance（constant）of the return ;  is a standard Gauss−Wiener process. Then the Black−Scholes approach
leads to the following formula for the return on this DC pension annuity :
  	
	
	


	

	

where  is the evaluation of DC pension annuity before invested and it equals the premium ;  is the
nominal rate of return on this annuity ;  is the real rate of return on this annuity, 
; 
is
the standard normal distribution function. 	
	
	 is the put option pre-
mium. Since is included in , the price of DC pension annuity is independent of individuals’ risk
types. Consequently, the option price of DC pension annuity for risk−neutral consumers is the same as the
one for risk−averse consumers. In the risk−neutral case, future price of DC pension annuity is discounted
by its expectation.
５−２ The fluctuation of the investment income
If the minimum coverage of a DC pension annuity is smaller than the DB pension annuity, risk−
averse consumers purchase DB pension annuities. In other words, if risk−averse consumers purchase DC
pension annuities, its minimum coverage is larger than DB pension annuity.
The claim of a DC pension annuity is composed of investment income added to minimum coverage
and option premium. However, since we can not know future investment income exactly, the claim de-
pends on the expected investment income. Therefore, if the expected investment income is high, the claim
is high, and vice versa.
Let claims of DC pension annuities in the second and third period denote  respectively. When
the rise of interest rate increases the expected rate of return on DC pension annuities, the expected rate of
growth on DC pension annuity, the minimum coverage and the claim increase respectively. Let the price
of this annuity at the beginning of the first period denote , and the real rate of return on this annuity
in the first and second period denote  respectively. Then the prices of this annuity in the second and
the third period are  respectively. Also, we assume the minimum coverage
equals the claim of a DB pension annuity and let it denote . When the change of the interest rate is
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expected, is rewritten as follows.
 
 



 	
When the interest rate increases, we assume the real rate of return on this annuity in the second and
third period increase at the same rate. Then the claims on the annuities in the second changes as follows.



 


 



 
From  	





	

Consequently, in the case of DC pension annuities, the rise of return rate increases the claim of DC pen-
sion annuities in the second period. When the rate of time preference is very high, the effects that the
rise of the return rate increases inefficiency in DC pension annuities are larger than DB pension annuities.
６．Conclusion
In many countries, many elderly people depend on government and employment−based pensions. The
modal pension in the developed countries was of the defined benefit several years ago. A governed−based
defined benefit system transfers income from workers to the retired generation, at least in part. But the
world’s population is rapidly growing aging, so the risks of underfunded plan terminations is increasing
and defined contribution plans are becoming more the norm in the developed countries. We build option
model for pricing individual defined contribution pension and examined weather individual defined contri-
bution pensions can reduce inefficiency in defined benefit pensions in this paper.
When the rate of time preference is very large, a rise of interest rate can increase inefficiency in de-
fined benefit（DB）annuity but reduce the increase of inefficiency. By contrast, when the rate of time pref-
erence is smaller than the interest rate, a rise of interest rate reduces the increase of inefficiency in DB
pension annuity.
When DC pension annuity has positive option premium, its price is larger than DB pension annuity.
Consequently, when the rate of time preference is large, we had better choose DC pension annuity. When
the rate of time preference is small, we had better choose DB pension annuity.
In the case of DB pension, current contributions may be used to support current retirees, at least in
part. Our model is not indexed to inflation, but the DB pension annuity is indexed to inflation only for
workers vesting after a fixed period of years. In this case, inefficiency in defined benefit pensions reduces.
When the aging population grows, we can not sustain DB pension institutions. We must examine the rela-
tion between the growth rate of population and pension institutions.
In the case of DC pension, contributions are invested, often at the participant’s direction, in stocks,
bonds, or other financial instruments. The DC pension sustains the value by giving consumers part of the
investment income. If the investment income is higher than minimum coverage, an excess is added to in-
surance. By contrast, if it is lower than minimum coverage, the minimum coverage is paid.
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Of course, the investment income risk is still there and unexpected economic fluctuation may let many
insurers bankrupt. Our model is not included the probability of insurers’ bankrupt. The factor of bankrupt
has effect of minimum coverage down and risk−averse consumers may shift DB pension annuity. We must
examine the relation between option price DC pension annuity and the probability of insurers’ bankrupt.
REFERENCES
Ahrend, Peter（１９９６）. “Pension Financial Security in Germany,” In Securing Employer−Based Pensions :
An International Perspective, Eds. Z. Bodie and O. S. Mitchell. Philadelphia, PA : Pension Research
Council and University of Pennsylvania Press,７３－１２０
Black, Fisher and Myron Scholes（１９７３）, “The Pricing of Options and Cooperate Liabilities,” Journal of
Political Economy,８１，６３７－６５４.
Bodie, Zvi and Robert C. Merton（１９９３）. “Pension Benefit Guarantees in the United States : A Functional
Analysis.” In The Future of Pensions in the United States, Ed. R. Schmitt. Philadelphia, PA : Pension
Research Council and University of Pennsylvania Press,１９４－２３４.
Binsbergen, Jules H. van and Michael W. Brandt（２００７）, “Solving Dynamic Portfolio Choice Problems by
Recursing on Optimized Portfolio Weights or on the Value Function?”, Computational Economics,
Vol.２９, Issue３－４，３５５－３６７.
Brandt, Michael W., Amit Goyal, Pedro Santa−Clara and Jonathan R. Stroud（２００５）, “A Simulation Ap-
proach to Dynamic Portfolio Choice with an Application to Learning about Return Predictability”, Re-
view of Financial Studies ,１８，８３１－８７３.
Brandt, Michael W. and Pedro Santa−Clara（２００６）, “Dynamic Portfolio Selection by Augmenting the Asset
Space”, The Journal of Finance, Vol.LXI, No.５，２１８７－２２１８.
Dahl, Mikkel and Thomas Moller（２００６）, “Valuation and Hedging of Life Insurance Liabilities with Sys-
tematic Morality Risk”, Insurance : Mathematics and Economics,３９，１９３－２１７.
Davis, E. Philip（１９９６）. “An International Comparison of the Financing of Occupational Pensions,” in Se-
curing Employed−Based Pensions : An International Perspective, Eds. Z. Bodie and O. S. Mitchell.
Philadelphia, PA : Pension Research Council and University of Pennsylvania Press,２４４－２８５
Diamond, Peter A. and James A Mirrlees（１９８５）. “Insurance Aspects of Pensions,” in Pensions, Labor, and
Individual Choice . David A. Wise, ed. Chicago : The University of Chicago Press,３１７－３５６.
Diamond, Peter A. and E. Sheshinsky（１９９５）. “Economic Aspects of Optimal Disability Benefits,” Journal
of Public Economics,１－２３.
Feldstein, Martin（１９８３）. “Should Private Pensions be Indexed?” in Financial Aspects of the United States
Pension System , ed. Zvi Bodie and John Shoven, Chicago, University of Chicago Press,２１１－２３０
Geanakoplos, John, Olivia S. Mitchell and Stephen Zeldes（１９９９）. “Social Security Money’s Worth,” In
Prospects for Social Security Reform . O.S. Mitchell, R. Myers and H. Young, eds. Pension Research
Council. Philadelphia, PA : University of Pennsylvania Press,７９－１５１.
International Association of Insurance Supervisors（２００６）. “Standard on Asset−Liability Management”, Stan-
dard , No.３.
Ippolito, Richard（１９８５）. “The Labor Contract and True Economic Pension Liabilities.” American Economic
Review .７５（５），１０３１－１０４３.
Ippolito, Richard（１９８９）. The Economic of Pension Insurance. Pension Research Council. Homewood, Illi-
nois : Dow Jones−Irwin.
James, Estelle and Dmitri Vittas（１９９６）. “Mandatory Savings Schemes : Are They an Answer to the Old
Age Security Problem?” in Securing Employer−Based Pensions : An International Perspective, Z.
Bodie and O. Mitchell, eds. Philadelphia, PA : Pension Research Council and University of Pennsylva-
nia Press,１５１－１９２.
Longstaff, Francis A. and Eduardo Schwartz（２００１）. “Valuing American Option by Simulation : A Simple
AOBA Nobuko
―２７０―
Least−Squares Approach”, The Review of Financial Studies , Vol.１４. No.１，１１３－１４７.
Merton, Robert ; Zvi Bodie and Alan J. Marcus（１９８７）. “Pension Plan Integration as Insurance Against So-
cial Security Risk.” In Issues In Pension Economics . J. Shoven and D. Wise, eds. Chicago : Univer-
sity of Chicago Press,１４７－１６９.
Mitchell, Olivia S., Jim Poterba, Mark Warshawsky and Jeff Brown（１９９９）. “New Evidence on the
Money’s Worth of Individual Annuities.” American Economic Review , Vol.８９. No.５，１２９９－１３１８.
Monden, Sinichi（２００９）. “A Dynamic Optimal Portfolio Strategy for the Insurance Liability Exposed to Un-
certainty in the Capital Market”, Journal of the Japanese Association of Risk, Insurance and Pension ,
Vol.４. No.１，６７－９９.（In Japanese）
Pesando, James（１９９６）. “The Government’s Role in Insuring Pensions,” in Securing Employer−Based Pen-
sions : An International Perspective, Z. Bodie and O.S. Mitchell, eds. Philadelphia, PA : Pension Re-
search Council and University of Pennsylvania Press,２８６－３１６.
Pelsser, Antoon（２００３）. “Pricing and Hedging Annuity Options via Static Option Replication”, Insurance :
Mathematics and Economics,３３，２８３－２９６.
Sass, Steven（１９９７）. The Promise of Private Pensions : The First Hundred Years , Cambridge, MA : Havard
University Press.
Yaari, M. E.（１９６５）. “Unception Lifetime, Life Insurance and the Theory of the Consumer,” Review of
Economic Studies ３２，１３７－１５０.
Zimbidis, Alexandros A.（２０１１）. “Optimal Management of a Variable Annuity Invested in a Black−Scholes
Market Driven by a Multidimensional Fractional Bronwnian Motion”, Stochastic Analysis and Applica-
tions,２９，６１－７７.
Defined Benefit Pension Annuity and Defined Contribution Pension Annuity
―２７１―
Abstract : In many countries, many elderly people depend on the government and employment−based
pensions. The modal pension in the developed countries was of the defined benefit several years ago. A
governed−based defined benefit system transfers income from workers to the retired generation, at least in
part. But the world’s population is rapidly growing aging, so the risks of underfunded plan terminations is
increasing and defined contribution plans are becoming more the norm in the developed countries. We
build an option model for pricing individual defined contribution pension and examined whether individual
defined contribution pensions can reduce inefficiency in defined benefit pensions in this paper.
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